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ABSTRACT
We believe that enterprises and other organisations currently
lack sophisticated methods and tools to determine if and how
IT changes should be introduced in an organisation, such
that objective, measurable goals are met. This is especially
true when dealing with security-related IT decisions. We re-
port on a feasibility study, Trust Economics, conducted to
demonstrate that such methodology can be developed. As-
suming a deep understanding of the IT involved, the main
components of our trust economics approach are: (i) assess
the economic or ﬁnancial impact of IT security solutions;
(ii) determine how humans interact with or respond to IT se-
curity solutions; (iii) based on above, use probabilistic and
stochastic modelling tools to analyse the consequences of IT
security decisions. In the feasibility study we apply the trust
economics methodology to address how enterprises should
protect themselves against accidental or malicious misuse of
USB memory sticks, an acute problem in many industries.
1. INTRODUCTION
Resilience of computing systems can often only be ad-
dressed meaningfully within the context in which the system
operates. That implies that benchmarking a system inde-
pendent of that context is not always of great value–instead,
computing systems need to be evaluated and optimised de-
pending on the situation at hand. In this paper, we dis-
cuss resilience within an exterprise context, and we establish
methodology to optimise IT decision-making based on the
ﬁnancial consequences of IT security decisions and policies.
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Interesting enough, resilience is itself a term that is often
used to denote the ability of an organisation to respond to
and introduce changes [6]. These changes do not necessarily
correspondto‘negative’events(failures, crimes)thatrequire
a reaction, but may often (and preferably) refer to proactive
voluntary improvements of the business operations. In this
paper we use such notions of enterprise resilience as a metric
(the ‘objective function’), but limit ourself to the role and
impact of IT only in achieving such resilience. That is, how
can an organisation manage its IT such that it improves the
organisation (and its resilience), expressed through metrics
such as employee productivity and ﬁnancial risk. We focus
on IT security in particular, trying to answer how security
policies or solutions should or could be changed to improve
enterprise resilience.
Senior managers (CEOs, CIOs, CISOs) with responsibil-
ityforinformationandsystemssecurityfacetwomajorprob-
lems. Firstly, there is poor economic understanding of how
to formulate, resource, measure, and value security policies.
There is also a poor organisational understanding of the atti-
tudes of users to both information and systems security and
of their responses to imposed security policies (as seen in the
Final Report of the ‘Trustguide’ project [9] and the Foresight
‘Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention’ report [10]).
Consequently, the effectiveness and value of the policies
with which users are expected to comply are very difﬁcult
to assess. To assess the effectiveness and value of secu-
rity investments in a system, be they in people, processes,
or technology, it is necessary to have a conceptualisation
(i.e., a model) of the system and its economic environment.
This model must also be accessible to those senior managers
charged with making systems security decisions.
These observations lead us to establish a methodology
(hereafter called trust economics methodology) that consists
of the following main aspects:
1. identifypossibleITsolutionsandthesystemproperties
1Figure 1: Combination of Modelling and Analysis Tech-
niques
they achieve;
2. assess economic or ﬁnancial impact of IT security so-
lutions and policies;
3. determine how humans interact with or respond to IT
security solutions, typically through empirical studies
of human decision making;
4. apply probabilistic and stochastic modelling tools to
determine the consequences of IT security decisions,
using the understanding gained from item 1 through 3.
We discuss the trust economics methodology in detail in
Section 2. We then apply this methodology in an informa-
tion security feasibility study of USB memory stick usage
(Section 3). This simple example addresses one of the main
threats companies have identiﬁed, namely the inappropriate
use of sensitive internal and external information. We end
the paper with a discussion of open issues and main chal-
lenges in implementing the trust economics methodology.
2. TRUSTECONOMICSMETHODOLOGY
Our proposed methodology relies on techniques from var-
ious disciplines, namely ﬁnances, economics, human sci-
ence, computerscience, andmathematics, asisapparentfrom
the depiction of the trust economics methodology in Figure
1. Figure 1 is to be read from ‘left to right’, starting from
a base ‘Information System’. This initial information sys-
tem may be a running system or a system design, although
in our scenarios we would assume systems users are famil-
iar with. ‘Empirical Behavioural Studies’ are used to un-
derstand how humans use information systems and would
react to proposed changes or new technologies. ‘Economic
Value Analysis’ sets the objectives and identiﬁes the links
with business goals. A deep understanding of the IT sys-
tem and these two analysis (that is, the behaviourial and
economic value analysis) form the input to the ‘Quantita-
tive Modelling’. In our speciﬁc methodology, we propose to
use TKS and Demos2K, as we explain in Section 2.3. The
results from the modelling are fed back into improving the
‘People, Processes, Technology’ within the information sys-
tem. A ‘Design Exploration’ and a ‘Run-time Optimisation’
loop can be envisaged, as well as a ‘Validation’ feedback
loop, as depicted.
We now discuss in detail the challenges and opportunities
behind the main facets of our trust economics methodology.
2.1 Economic Value Analysis
A challenging aspect of the trust economics methodology
is to identify the link between IT security decisions and eco-
nomic or ﬁnancial consequences. The most common way in
which IT is related to business consequences is through ser-
vice level agreements (SLAs) that include monetary awards
and penalties for making or missing service level objectives.
SuchSLAsprovideaverypowerfulmechanismtodetermine
the ﬁnancial implications of IT decisions, for instance allow-
ing one to determine the ﬁnancial beneﬁt of improving sys-
tem monitoring and performance prediction in service pro-
vision systems [16].
It should be noted that SLAs are not yet very well estab-
lished in the security area, and to assess the impact of se-
curity mechanisms and policies we would need to develop
meaningful security SLA descriptions ﬁrst. When SLAs are
not present, establishing the economic or ﬁnancial conse-
quences of IT decisions is much harder. Some literature ex-
ists relating software security vulnerability disclosures with
their impact on stock prices [18], but such results are dif-
ﬁcult to obtain and equally difﬁcult to make use of in our
models. (See [2] for a discussion of metrics.) The feasibil-
ity case study of Section 3 will underline the challenges this
aspect of our methodology faces.
2.2 Empirical Behavioural Studies
The effectiveness of enterprise security policies and tech-
nologies very much depends on the way humans (employees
as well as operations staff) implement and use these policies.
To determine in a meaningful way if a proposed security pol-
icy makes trust economic sense, human behaviour needs to
be predicted. In our methodology, empirical studies are used
to create a model of the human decision-making related to
the proposed security policies and technologies.
In our case study, we interviewed users of proposed in-
formation security solutions to identify how they acted (or
would have acted) in various situations. The empirical stud-
ieshaveshedlightonwhichattackscenariosthatthespecial-
ist thought was most likely or important. Obviously, not all
human behaviour can be expected to surface in interviews,
especially not planned criminal behaviour or outlines for se-
curity attacks, but we have obtained insight into the threats
perceived by IT staff.
The empirical behavioural studies, together with the eco-
2nomic value analysis form the input to the quantitative mod-
els we use to decide about IT plans. Moreover, a continuous
validation feedback must exists from observation of the IT
systems to the empirical studies and the economic analysis.
2.3 Quantitative Modelling
The trust economics methodology contends that invest-
ment decisions should be based on analytic models of the
behaviour of information systems in the context of the envi-
ronmental threats they face. We therefore introduce a math-
ematical framework, together with a modelling philosophy,
for capturing the structural and dynamical properties of sys-
temsandtheirassociatedsecurityoperations. Themainchal-
lenge that we aim to confront is in developing a method for
integrating mathematical modelling of the technological as-
pects of a system, with user models and economic models,
as a means to evaluate a system.
Computing science research has established a set of tools
for quantitative modelling using discrete-event dynamic sys-
tems. Discrete-event dynamic systems is a natural modelling
formalisms for man-made systems [7], in which events and
correspondingsystemstatechangeshappenatdiscretepoints
in time. To obtain interesting metrics from such models,
state probabilities can be computed, either through numeri-
calalgorithmsordiscrete-eventsimulation. Well-established
software tools such as Sharpe [15], M¨ obius [4] or Demos2K
[5] exist to develop the model (using various formalisms, in-
cluding Petri nets and stochastic process algebras).
One of the challenges the trust economics methodology
tries to address is intuitive modelling of the non-formal con-
cepts related to human behaviour. To that end, we envisage
several modelling technologies to be applied and extended,
and conversions between these models to be established. In
ourcasestudyweuseTKS[8]tomediatebetweentheresults
of non-formal empirical studies on human decision-making
and the formal models we use to evaluate the systems and
policies.
3. USB FEASIBILITY STUDY
Protection of data and information is of critical impor-
tance to many enterprises, and various IT security products
and solutions are available to protect against accidental or
malicious data leakage. However, introducing such infor-
mation security technologies has considerable impact on the
operation of the enterprise, since it may impact day-to-day
work habits of individuals (e.g., it may introduce restrictions
on the material employees may download or upload). For
an enterprise to be resilient, we contend that it needs to in-
troduce such new technologies using sophisticated analysis
of the impact on employee productivity, costs, etc. In other
words, applying the trust economics methodology would es-
tablish (or at least improve) enterprise resilience.
The feasibility study targets information security, which
is a sensitive issue in many enterprises. In particular, we
study how the use of USB memory sticks may put enter-
prises at risk, and we study the cost and beneﬁts of protec-
tion software. A feasibility study is a restricted case study to
demonstrate the viability of the proposed methodology. As
a consequence, the results we show provide initial insights,
but a much more in-depth case study is needed to address
IT investment questions of security administrators related to
USB protection software.
Employees within an organization may be given a USB
storage device upon which to place company-managed data.
It is the intention that this data can then be accessed at other
locations, such as at an employee’s home, in transit between
work locations (e.g., on a train), during work presentations,
or at a client’s premises. As such the adoption of USB stor-
agedevicesisreservedforthoseworkingenvironmentswhere
ﬂexibility in working practices is a requirement. This then
correlates with the concept of resilience, in that ﬂexibility
is knowingly introduced into the company network to allow
employees greater freedom in where they use company data.
The company network may have to interact with USB
storage devices that are in or have moved through a num-
ber of operational states. Devices can potentially be moved
between secure and insecure environments. This may incor-
porate the modiﬁcation, addition or removal of data within
these environments. Devices may be handled by legitimate
users, but also by malicious parties (potentially within or
outside the organization). Devices may be encrypted or un-
encrypted and the data that a device holds may require mea-
sured treatment within the company’s data management
scheme. Devicesareintendedtobeusedtostorelegitimately
obtained data (i.e., work ﬁles) that correspond to the ac-
cess rights of the individual. However, one can easily imag-
ine scenarios in which maliciously-oriented carriage of data
(e.g., transfer of sensitive ﬁles outside of the network), or in-
troduction of viruses or ’malware’ into the company domain
occur.
We will ﬁrst review the various security solutions avail-
able to protect against USB stick misuse.
3.1 IT Solutions for Information Security
Withinthefeasibilitystudy, weconductedanin-depthsur-
veyandstudyofthetechnologiestosupportthesecureuseof
USB memory sticks [11, 12]. Various software solutions ex-
ist that provide control of data security within an enterprise
environment. Different categories of products were visited
in the survey, such as USB device protection, Digital Rights
Management, at-rest disk encryption and operating system
solutions (mostly related to the Microsoft Windows OS fam-
ily).
To address the economic value analysis, [11] lists the cost
models and actual prices of various products. This provides
ﬁgures that can be used as a foundation for the subsequent
modelling of the economic factors related to data security.
Decisions pertaining to security infrastructure must consider
the costs of a complete ‘solution’, including elements such
as cost of IT personnel to run the system, cost of updates and
3patches, possible cost of tracing and monitoring for unpro-
tected machines, the cost of teaching and informing users,
and other hardware and software support. This takes us quite
a long way in assessing the cost of a USB protection solu-
tion, but a true economic value analysis should also include
a risk analysis of security breaches and of breaking regula-
tions, as well as a ﬁnancial impact analysis of productivity
loss caused by the security solution. We ﬁnally note that in
the marketing literature of the products surveyed, economic
considerations are always discussed from the perspective of
the enterprise, and incentives for users are difﬁcult to iden-
tify and typically not discussed in product and technology
documentation.
There are a number of issues regarding human vulnera-
bilities and productivity that must also be considered. All
of the proposed technologies considered the human aspect
in their design and product. Tools exist for online training
during use of the software, some providing help messages
and explanatory text associated with speciﬁc security-related
activities. We found, again, that the perspective is almost
exclusively that of imposing rules on users, with little inno-
vation being put into identifying ways to provide incentives
that change user behaviour. The empirical studies provided
several examples of the effects of these rules. The inten-
tion of the policy, from an organisational view, was to pro-
vide conﬁdentiality; the effect on the users was to reduce
availability (e.g., one might not be able to show a presenta-
tion or prepared document). This impacts both the business
(missed business opportunity in the short term, reduction in
perceived competence in the long term) and the individual
(missed opportunity, embarrassment, doubts about personal
competence).
From the operational perspective, a bottleneck and poten-
tialvulnerabilityliesintheroleoftheITadministrator. Most
systems are centrally managed, and any deviation from the
deﬁned rules needs approval by the IT administrator. As a
consequence, the system’s inﬂexibility may result in produc-
tivity loss for employees or at the least a reduction in the ca-
pacity of a company to accommodate atypical, unpredictable
working practices (see also [12]).
3.2 Examination of Human Behaviour
To obtain an empirical basis for our model, we conducted
a study to elicit factors that contribute to corporate and in-
dividual security cost. We conducted 17 in-depth interviews
with security staff, employees and managers in the two com-
panies who are partners in this research project. The inter-
views remained anonymous, and were semi-structured, ex-
ploring aspects such as the tasks and responsibilities of the
interviewees, their perception of the risks facing the com-
pany, their attitudes and perceived impact of security met-
rics, etc. All interviewees were asked about one speciﬁc se-
curity problem: USB sticks, and we suggested the company
was considering making the use of encrypted USB sticks
mandatory. We refer to [3] for details, here we sketch the
Figure 2: Working locations and their associated threats.
methodology used and highlight some results.
The interviews were transcribed, and analyzed using tech-
niques from Grounded Theory [17], a qualitative data anal-
ysis method widely used in social sciences, allowing identi-
ﬁcation of salient concepts and relationships between them.
Over the past 10 years, the method has been successfully
applied to model user perceptions and attitudes in human-
computer interaction in general [1, 19].
From the interviews we were able to identify two main
USB stick usage scenarios. These scenarios broadly corre-
sponded to the type of organization the subject worked for.
Here we discuss one scenario in a little more detail. In this
scenario, the USB stick is primarily used for temporary stor-
age for transit between locations such as an employee visit-
ing a client company to deliver a presentation. The data re-
quired to deliver the presentation would be copied from the
companys computer system onto the USB stick and taken to
the clients location. Any data which must be brought back
to the home company can be copied from the clients system
onto the USB stick and brought back by the employee.
Themainconcernforthesecuritymanagerinthisscenario
isthepotentialconﬁdentialityissuesresultingfromcompany
data being transported through unsecure locations while in
transit to and from the client. If the USB stick was lost or
stolen at this time while containing unencrypted data, then
the cost in terms of reputation and lost business would be to
thecompanyitselfratherthantheindividual. Whilethecom-
pany can punish the individual internally, it cannot recoup
its losses by doing so. As a consequence, this scenario en-
courages the security manager to take a conﬁdentiality ﬁrst
approach when designing the USB control policy. The risk
model we develop in Section 3.3 which quantiﬁes breaches
of conﬁdentiality, uses the above scenario. We refer to [3]
for a detailed analysis.
4fraction conﬁdentiality mean time between
encrypted exposures loss exposures
no traitors 80% 4.18 9.68 755.5
with traitors 80% 7.72 98.46 357.7
no traitors 100% 3.90 0 948.0
with traitors 100% 8.06 125.67 356.8
Table 1: Conﬁdentiality Loss, depending on the encryption level and the existence of traitors.
3.3 Mathematical Systems Modelling
The mathematical model that is the core of the trust eco-
nomics methodology (see Section 2.3 and the box ‘Quantita-
tive Modelling’ in Figure 1) needs to account for the follow-
ing: (i) the environment (economics, threats, human factors,
etc.) within which the system exists; (ii) the (distributed) lo-
cationstructureofthesystem; (iii)theresourceelementsthat
are scattered around that structure (including people); (iv)
the processes that execute on top of all of (i)-(iii) (including
human behaviours). Our approach is that of classical applied
mathematics. We use techniques from algebra, logic, prob-
ability theory, queuing theory, and theoretical computer sci-
ence [13, 14], and we make use of the Demos2k tool kit [5]
that provides a realization of some of the above modelling
methods.
We have already mentioned in Section 3.2 the various
ways people told us they use USB sticks. Although there
were several different usage scenarios described, it was pos-
sible to abstract common ways in which USB data sticks
wereused, e.g., transferofdatabetweencolleaguesandbusi-
ness partners. Figure 2 depicts the different players in these
scenarios. For details of the Demos2k model, we refer to [3].
Basedontheinterviews, ourmodelexhibitsaplayercalled
‘Friend’ to represent legitimate recipients. At ﬁrst sight, it
may seem surprising that business data could be taken into
a home environment. Many modern businesses recognise,
however, the practicality of employees working on projects
at home. In changing location, the holder would often need
to use transport such as car, train and plane, or use a ho-
tel. These transient locations represent places at which the
USB could be lost, and potentially be recovered by an adver-
sary (i.e., ‘Foe’). The other main places at which data could
be captured by adversaries are clients (i.e., external business
situations, conferences and such like), and in dealing with
people masquerading as Friends (i.e., ‘Traitors’).
There are also risks associated with data capture, namely
exposure of a USB containing conﬁdential information by
an adversary in a context where they can freely extract the
information. This is potentially very serious and can lead to
severe reputation damage to the organisation and individu-
als concerned, especially if the information is subsequently
used in a publicly damaging manner (i.e., business advan-
tage, press leaks). The cost of these breaches could be very
high. In our model, we assume that, once the USB is under
an adversary’s control, there is some probability that the in-
formation will be exposed. We handle this probabilistically
toreﬂectthefactthatexposureisnotaperfectoperation. Ac-
cidental archiving of USB-held material (either encrypted or
unencrypted) onto someone else’s PC is considered a milder
form of exposure that can lead to personal embarrassment
of the employee, but generally does not have direct external
consequences. The cost of these breaches to the corporation
is much less.
Figure 3: Common USB user actions.
To incorporate all the above, the model represents ‘a day
in the life’ of a USB memory stick. The common tasks un-
dertaken by the user (shown in Figure 3), such as manip-
ulating data on the memory stick, exchanging data with a
colleague or replacing a lost memory stick, are represented
explicitly in the model. In turn, these entities are built from
the fundamental operations of adding, reading, and delet-
ing encrypted and unencrypted data from the memory stick.
Concurrently, a movement entity changes the location of the
memory stick and its user according to Figure 2, between
different types of work location, home, and ‘in transit’, with
therelativefrequencyofthedifferenttasksandeventschang-
ing at each location.
Some initial results are given in Table 1, for one year of
USB use. Conﬁdentiality loss is the product of number of
exposures and the amount of data that can be seen (a Traitor
can see all data, including encrypted data, while a Foe can
only see unencrypted data). The main result obtained from
5the simple initial model is that encryption can provide a per-
fect solution, but only if there are no traitors in the organi-
sation. If traitors are present, encryption can only be a par-
tial solution. The main message is to reduce the possibil-
ity of traitors, and manage their presence through a holistic,
policy-driven approach to vetting and information security
management.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces the trust economic methodology to
improve decision-making about IT security. The trust eco-
nomics methodology bases investment decisions on analytic
models of the behaviour of information systems in the con-
text of the environmental threats they face. It consists of
a mathematical framework, together with a modelling phi-
losophy, integrating mathematical modelling of the techno-
logical aspects of a system, with user models and economic
models, as a means to evaluate a system. The methodology
improves enterprise resilience by providing tools that allow
the enterprise to better react to or introduce change.
The presented USB feasibility case study demonstrates
the application of the methodology to enterprise information
security decisions. Considerable research challenges have
been uncovered during the feasibility study. These include
establishing and quantifying economic and business impact
of IT decisions, capturing human decision-making, devel-
oping realistic attack and vulnerability models, and enhanc-
ing the modelling techniques. To leverage the established
trust economics methodology it is important to create intu-
itive tool support for IT staff, and where appropriate achieve
automation of the trust economics based decision making
process.
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